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Abstract
Using data on articles published in the top-five economic journals in the period
1991 to 2010, we explore whether the gender composition of editorial boards is related
to the publishing success of female authors and to the quality of articles that get
published. Our results show that female editors reduce, rather than increase, the
share of articles that are (co-)authored by females. We also find evidence that female
editors benefit article quality at low levels of representation on editorial boards, but
harm article quality at higher levels. Several robustness checks corroborate these
findings. Our results are broadly consistent with existing evidence on the behavior
of gender-mixed hiring committees and of relevance for gender equality policy.
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1 Introduction
In many areas in the economy, women are still severely under-represented. The economics
profession is no exception, notwithstanding some significant changes over the last two
decades. According to the annual report of the Committee on the Status of Women in
the Economics Profession (CSWEP)1, the share of female full-time economics professors
has doubled between 1993 and 2015, increasing from a low 6.7% to 12.2% (Bartlett, 1999;
McElroy, 2016) – which is still a very small figure, by any standard. Moreover, with only
one in eight full-time economic professors being female, but a nearly threefold share (34.7%)
of females among new PhD students in 2015, far fewer female than male economists are
destined to enter the upper echelons of the academic hierarchy (McElroy, 2016). The
reasons for this differential performance in careers are still disputed, despite extensive past
research on the root causes of gender bias in employment and promotions both within and
outside academia.
In this study, we explore a potential channel which to date has received surprisingly
little, if indeed any, attention in the economics literature, the male domination of editorial
boards and its consequences for the publishing success of female economists. Editors are
important nodes, or gatekeepers, in the publishing process who ultimately decide which
articles get slots in journals.2 Such slots are limited and highly competitive, particu-
larly in top economics journals.3 Top publications are regarded a prime indicator for the
productivity and potential of economists, and as such of great importance for tenure deci-
sions, pay levels, and the ability of researchers to obtain third-party funding (Hamermesh,
2017).4 Gender bias in the editorial process, if indeed present, may also entail significant
efficiency losses if such bias adversely affects article quality. Knowledge of the role that
1The CSWEP is a standing committee of the American Economic Association since 1971. One of
its tasks is to regularly monitor and report on the progress of professional women economists. Since its
founding, CSWEP has surveyed some 250 departments annually.
2Editors can also take more indirect influence, e.g. by selectively assigning submissions to reviewers
who favor certain subjects or do a better job at reviewing (which improves manuscript quality), or by
influencing the decisions of other editors in board meetings or informal talks (Addis and Villa, 2003).
3Acceptance rates in the top five economic journals have fallen from 15 percent to approximately 6
percent over the last two decades (Card and DellaVigna, 2013).
4The overarching importance of publications for academic promotions find vivid expression in the
popular proverb ”publish or perish”, a term first used in the academic context in 1927 (Doyle et al., 2012).
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male-dominated editorial boards play in the publishing process is hence of great inter-
est for equity (gender equality) and efficiency reasons. We explore both dimensions by
analysing articles published in the period 1991 to 2010 in the top-five economics journals,
that is, the American Economic Review (AER), Econometrica (ECO), the Journal of Po-
litical Economy (JPE), the Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE), and the Review of
Economic Studies (RES). Exploiting for identification variation across journals and time
in the share of female editors, we produce first empirical evidence on two related questions:
first, whether the share of females in an editorial board has an impact on the share of
articles (co-)authored by females that are published in a journal; and second, whether the
extent of female representation on editorial boards affects article quality, as measured by
the citations that published journal articles receive.
Our results show that female editorship affects both the frequency of female authorship
and the quality of published articles. Specifically, we find the appointment of female editors
to reduce the share of articles that are (co-)authored by females. We also find evidence that
female editors benefit article quality at low levels of representation on editorial boards, but
tend to harm article quality at higher levels. These findings suggest that the publishing
process in economics is not governed by simple sex discrimination against women that could
be easily rectified by (and hence would justify undifferentiated calls for) greater female
representation on editorial boards. Given our data, we cannot test explicitly for the causal
pathways underlying these relationships. However, our results are broadly consistent with
theories, and findings in related areas, that stress the importance of gender composition of
hiring committees for committee behavior.
Our study complements and contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First
and foremost, this is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, to inquire into how
the gender composition of editorial boards is related to the publishing success of female
researchers and to the quality of articles that get published. Very few studies, in fact,
have to date investigated the behavior of journal editors, despite their pivotal role in the
publishing process and the importance of publications for academic careers (Laband and
Piette, 1994; Medoff, 2003; Brogaard et al., 2014; Colussi, 2017). These studies, however,
focus on professional ties, not gender differences, between editors and authors and whether
2
such professional ties harm article quality because of favoritism. Second, we also add
to the still small, but closely related, strand of literature which explores how the gender
composition of evaluation committees in academia impacts the chances of female candidates
to get hired or promoted (Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2010; Bagues et al., 2017). Bagues
and Esteve-Volart (2010) find relatively more female evaluators in recruiting committees
for positions in the four main Corps of the Spanish Judiciary to reduce the chance of
female candidates to be hired. Bagues et al. (2017), in turn, find that a larger presence
of female evaluators in hiring committees for associate and full professorship positions in
all academic disciplines in Italy and Spain does not increase either the quantity or the
quality of female candidates who qualify. If anything, there is some indication that gender-
mixed committees on some occasions tend to be less favorable towards female candidates
than all-male committees and that men become less favorable towards female candidates
as soon as a woman joins the committee. Finally, our study relates to a large and diverse
literature which is concerned with various root causes for the female under-representation
in the economics profession. Conceptually, this literature falls into two types, demand-
side and supply-side explanations. Demand-side explanations center around the potential
discrimination of women by employers, i.e. universities and research institutions (Kahn,
1993; Paola and Scoppa, 2015; Addis and Villa, 2003; Ginther and Kahn, 2004). Studies in
this branch of literature suggest that women may suffer from statistical discrimination when
productivity is unobservable or from decision-makers’ aversion to interact with women.
Supply-side explanations, in turn, emphasize potential male-female productivity gaps, as
women often lack professional networks and female mentors (Blau et al., 2010; McDowell
et al., 2006). There is also some evidence from this literature that women are less inclined
to apply for promotions (Paola et al., 2015), that they shy away more from competition
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2010), and that they devote relatively more time to socially
desirable tasks which do not get rewarded through promotions (Misra et al., 2012).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and identification strategy
we use in our empirical analysis. Section 3 presents and discusses our regression results,
including various robustness tests and heterogeneity checks. Finally, Section 4 summarizes
our main findings, highlights areas that warrant further study, and concludes.
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2 Data and Empirical Strategy
2.1 Data
For the empirical analysis, we compiled a new data set that contains information on all
regular articles published in the period 1991 to 2010 in the top-five economics journals
(AER, ECO, JPE, QJE, and RES ).5 Our observation period starts in 1991 because of a
major change in the Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classification system in 1990
(see below for details) and ends in 2010 so that each article has a minimum vintage since
publication of at least six years before we measure their quality on 30 December 2016
through the cumulative citations they have received until this date. Overall, our data set
contains information on 4, 431 articles.
For each article in our data set, we collected and merged information from three sources:
the article itself, editorial information provided in individual issues, and Web of Science
(WoS) citation statistics. From the articles themselves, which are our unit of analysis, we
recorded the journal in which they appeared, their year of publication, their issue number,
their first and last page number, and the names and institutional affiliations (at the time of
publication) of each of their authors. We then merged to each article editorial information
(names of editorial board members) for the years 1988 to 2010 which we obtained from
the Front Matter of individual issues in the respective journal a particular article was
published. Finally, we added WoS cumulative citation counts to our data (our measure of
article quality), which we extracted in December 2016. From this raw data, we constructed
our two dependent variables (female authorship and article citations), our key explanatory
variable (female editorship), as well as various control variables which capture features of
articles of potential relevance for their scholarly impact. In the following, we discuss each
of these in turn.
Female Authorship: The gender of authors is not reported in articles (and neither
is the gender of editors in the front matters). We assigned gender to authors (and editors)
5We exclude articles that are comments, replies, or notes. We also exclude articles which were published
in special issues and in the Papers and Proceedings issues of the AER.
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using a three-step procedure. First, we checked (by hand) whether the first name provided
a clear indication of a person’s gender. If it did not, we checked for auxiliary information
(such as photos) on the person’s website that could help determine the gender. Finally,
for cases still unresolved, we took recourse to two lists of first names (one for women and
one for men) created after the 1990 U.S. Census by the Post-enumeration Survey (PES).6
Both lists contain first names and their respective likelihoods to appear in the PES. If
a first name appears both in the female and in the male list, we assigned that gender
to a person for which the first name has a higher likelihood of appearance.7 Using this
gender information, we then constructed our measures of female authorship (and female
editorship). In line with the literature (Laband and Piette, 1994; Medoff, 2003; Brogaard
et al., 2014), we define female authorship of an article in our baseline specification by way
of a dichotomous variable which takes value one if an article has at least one female author,
and zero otherwise.8
Female Editorship: Finding an appropriate measure for the degree of female repre-
sentation on an editorial board of a journal at the time that it decides on the acceptance or
rejection of a particular article submitted for publication is more demanding than defining
female authorship. This is for two reasons. First, the top-five economics journals publish
different types of editors in the Front Matter of their issues which may not be involved
to the same degree in the actual editorial decision process. Second, as lags between the
submission and actual publication of articles vary across articles, journals, and time (El-
lison, 2002), and are often very sizable in length, editors named in the Front Matter of a
particular issue need not be the editors that have actually decided to accept the articles
published in that issue. Concerning the first issue, there is little consensus in the literature
that could provide guidance (Laband and Piette, 1994; Medoff, 2003; Brogaard et al., 2014;
6The PES is an independent survey conducted after a census that is used to evaluate the quality of the
census.
7For about 45 percent of the articles, the gender of all authors could be determined using the first
method. For about 97 percent of the articles, the gender of all authors could be determined using the first
two methods, and for about 98 percent of the articles, the gender of all authors could be determined using
all three methods. For less than two percent of articles, the gender of all authors could not be determined.
We exclude these articles from our estimation sample. The gender of all editors could be obtained with
the first and second method.
8In our robustness analysis, we will use also alternative thresholds to define female authorship of an
article.
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Colussi, 2017).9 We therefore asked the editorial office of each journal, which editors at the
journal actually directly handle, and ultimately decide on, submitted manuscripts. Based
on the feedback we received from these inquiries, we consider for the QJE the board of
editors (3-4 persons, depending on the issue), for ECO the editor and coeditors (1 editor
and 3-6 coeditors, depending on the issue), for the RES the managing editors (2-5 persons,
depending on the issue), for the AER the editor and coeditors (1 editor and 3-6 coeditors,
depending on the issue), and for the JPE only the editors (4-7 persons, again depending on
the issue) which are named also on the Front Matter of its issues. Henceforth, we will refer
to these decision-makers as ’editors’, irrespective of their formal status and denomination
at a particular journal outlet.10 Concerning the second issue, previous studies either ignore
submission-to-publication lags (Laband and Piette, 1994; Medoff, 2003; Colussi, 2017), or
consider the editorial board in charge one, two, or three years before the publication of an
article (Brogaard et al., 2014). In our study, we follow the latter approach. Specifically, we
consider in our baseline specification the average share of female editors of a journal over
the three years before an article was published (henceforth referred to as ’editor share’),
but also make use of alternative measures in our robustness checks.11
Article Citations: As a proxy for the quality of articles, we obtained cumulative Web
of Science (WoS) citation counts for each article in our data set from the WoS website.12
We used the advanced search option on the WoS website for a listing of all published
articles by journal and year and their citations reported in the different WoS databases.
Our citation count is based on the total number of citations reported in these databases.
9Laband and Piette (1994) consider all editors, coeditors, and associate editors. Medoff (2003) and
Colussi (2017) consider only the editor and coeditors, and Brogaard et al. (2014) only editors.
10Female editors in our sample have a lower h-index and have published less articles in the top-five
economics journals in the five years prior to their appointment than their male editorial colleagues at the
time of their appointment. All female editors, as well as nearly all male editors, are affiliated to top-ranked
US universities.
11Knowing the editors for each issue, we first calculated for each issue the share of female editors named
in the respective Front Matter. We then calculated the mean annual share for a particular year by adding
the female editor shares of all issues and dividing this sum by the total number of issues in the respective
year. Note that this share is affected not only by appointments and retirements of editors, but also by
changes in the absolute number of editors and the time that a new appointment or retirement occurs
within a particular year (i.e. from which issue in a year an editorial change takes effect).
12Access to the WoS website at https://apps.webofknowledge.com is restricted to registered individ-
ual or institutional users and requires login.
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We collected this citation data on a single day, 30 December 2016. Articles in our data
therefore have a vintage of at least six years before taking stock of the scholarly impact.
JEL Codes: Some fields are more heavily researched than others, and some fields may
be researched more by female economists than male economists. This is of importance, as
articles from more heavily researched fields are likely to get cited more often. To control for
such potential level differences in citations by research area, we generate a set of indicator
variables that classify articles into major fields – the twenty 1-digit Journal of Economic
Literature (JEL) codes – using the JEL information provided for each article on the EconLit
webpage (Medoff, 2003). Most articles state more than one field and hence have more than
one JEL code. The last major change in the JEL classification system occured in 1990
(Cherrier, 2017). It is for this reason that we restrict our analysis to articles which have
been published after 1990.
No. of Authors, Length of Article, and Year of Publication: The ability of
an article to generate citations (our measure of article quality) may also vary with the
number of authors to an article, its length, and its year of publication. More authors are
likely to enjoy efficiency gains from specialization and a division of labor (Boschini and
Sjo¨rgen, 2007), and higher quality research may require more pages (Medoff, 2003). Time
of publication is likely to correlate systematically with citations. As we record citations
for all articles at the same point in time (30 December 2016), articles published earlier are
of older vintage when we measure their scholarly impact. To account for these potentially
confounding influences in our regression analysis, we generated two sets of indicators, one
for the year of publication of an article, and one for the number of authors to an article.
We also generated a measure of the standardized page length of an article. For this, we
first calculated the unadjusted page length of an article as the difference between the page
number of the last and first page of an article, plus one. As the formats of published articles
and hence their page densities (in terms of letters to a page) differ between journals, we
then normalized the page length of an article to a page length compliant to AER page
limits, using the procedure in Card and DellaVigna (2013).
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2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for all regular articles published in the top-five eco-
nomics journals in 1991-2010. Columns 1-5 consider each of the five journals separately,
column 6 the total sum of all articles published in these journals. The AER accounts for
most articles in our sample (25.4%), the shares of the other journals vary between 18.1%
and 19.2%.13 Overall, our data set contains information on 4, 431 articles.
Table 1 provides several insights. First, as shown in the first row of Panel A, females
account for only 4.1% of editors among the top-five economics journals in the observation
period. This very low average is caused to a large part by two factors. First, two journals,
the QJE and the RES, have no female editor in any year of our observation period.
Second, no top-five journal has a non-zero female editor share before 1997. These important
heterogeneities across journals and time are illustrated also in Figure 1, which plots for
the period 1991 to 2010 for each journal and year our baseline measure of the female
editor share, i.e. the average share of female editors for the 3 years prior to a particular
calendar year. Figure 1 reveals that the three top-five journals with a non-zero female editor
share (AER, ECO, JPE ) display sizable year-to-year changes in the gender composition of
their editorial boards. The female editor share hence exhibits great variability both across
journals and time, a variability we will exploit for identification in our empirical analysis.
Second, articles with at least one female author account for only 16.3% of all articles
in our data (see second row of Panel A in Table 1). Female-authored articles are most
common in the QJE (21.0%), and least frequent in ECO (10.5%). The shares in the other
journals fall in a narrow range between 15.9% and 17.6%. Further insights are provided by
Figure 2, which plots for each journal the share of articles per annum that have some female
author. First, the share of female-authored articles has risen steadily for all journals over
the twenty years we consider in our data; and second, the share of female-authored articles
in a journal, and differences in that share between journals, displays great variability across
time.
13The AER publishes by far the most articles per year (an average of 56.3 per year in our observation
period), and RES the least (40.1). QJE, JPE, and ECO publish respectively 41.4, 41.4, and 42.5 articles
per year.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
AER ECO JPE QJE RES All
A. Gender composition (share female):
Editorship .082 .042 .083 .000 .000 .041
Authorship .176 .105 .159 .210 .160 .163
B. Article citations:
WoS (mean) 126.8 123.3 123.5 184.0 71.8 126.2
WoS (median) 71.0 59.0 62.0 109.0 33.0 63.0
C. Article features (mean):
No. of standardized pages 38.6 40.7 36.3 37.3 39.7 38.5
No. of authors 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.9
No. of JEL codes 1.9 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.7
Vintage (years) 15.1 15.8 16.2 15.6 15.0 15.5
Share of articles: .254 .192 .187 .187 .181 1
No. of articles: 1,125 849 828 827 802 4,431
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for all regular articles published in the top-five economics
journals in the years 1991-2010. All entries are means, except for WoS (median) article citations
reported in Panel B. Panel A reports the share of female editors and the share of articles with at
least one female author. Panel B reports mean and median cumulative Web of Science (WoS) article
citations as of December 2016. Panel C reports mean article length based on standardized pages,
which were calculated using a routine suggested by Card and DellaVigna (2013), the mean number of
authors of articles, the mean number of 1-digit JEL codes recorded for articles on EconLit, as well as
the mean vintage (in years) of articles published in our observation period (1991-2010) at the time we
measure their scholarly impact by WoS citations in December 2016.
Third, mean citations vary greatly across the top-five economics journal (see Panel B
in Table 1). They are highest for the QJE (184.0 citations), and lowest for RES (71.8 cita-
tions), with shares for the remainder of journals all clustered closely around 125 citations
per article. The clear top position for the QJE in our data, but not the bottom one for
RES, is consistent with recent Journal Citation Reports by Thomson Reuters, the most
widely referenced journal ranking in use.14 Furthermore, median WoS citations are much
14However, the top rank for the QJE, and the bottom rank for the RES we find, is consistent with
the journal rankings emerging from previous research that covers observation periods similar to the one
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Figure 1: Share of female editors per annum in the top-five economics journals, 1991-2010
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Notes: The figure plots the female editor shares for the period 1991 to 2010 in the American Economic
Review (AER), Econometrica (ECO), the Journal of Political Economy (JPE), the Quarterly Journal of
Economics (QJE), and the Review of Economic Studies (RES). The female editor shares are averages of
the shares of female editors over the last 3 years prior to a particular calendar year.
smaller than mean WoS citations for all five journals, which indicates that the citation
distribution is heavily right-skewed. Our WoS citation counts also host some sizable out-
liers. 5.4% (15.1%) of articles have received less than 10 (20) citations as of 2016; at the
same time, the most cited paper (5, 075 citations) received 40.2 times as many citations as
the average article in our data (not shown in table). In the empirical analysis, we will take
into account both such (potentially influential) outliers and the skewness of the citation
distribution.
Fourth, concerning article features of potential relevance for the scholarly impact of a
considered in this study (Card and DellaVigna, 2013; Hamermesh, 2017).
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Figure 2: Share of female-(co-)authored articles per annum in the top-five economics jour-
nals, 1991-2010
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Notes: The figure plots for each of the top 5 economic journals (AER, ECO, JPE, QJE, and RES) in the
period 1991 to 2010 the annual share of articles that are (co-)authored by a female researcher.
study, several insights are provided by Panel C in Table 1. For one thing, mean article
length (measured in standardized pages) varies little across journals. Articles in ECO are
the longest (40.7 pages), and articles in the JPE the shortest (36.3 pages). Average article
length in our data is 38.5 pages. Over time, average page length has increased substantially
in all five journals – in our data, by about a third from 1991-2000 to 2001-2010 (not shown
in Table 1).15 For another, articles with multiple authorship clearly dominate, in particular
joint work by two co-authors. Articles with two authors account for nearly half (47.2%)
of all articles in our data, while single-authored articles account for only a third (34.4%)
15This trend development is well documented in the literature (Card and DellaVigna, 2013; Ellison,
2002).
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(not shown in Table 1).16 The average number of authors to an article in our data is 1.9.
Concerning thematic breadth, the average number of JEL codes used to classify an article is
1.7 and varies from 1.4 for ECO to 1.9 for the AER. The three JEL codes used most often in
the classification of an article are (D) Microeconomics (41.0%), (J) Labor and Demographic
Economics (18.0%), and (C) Mathematical and Quantitative Methods (17.7%).17 Although
all journals cover also the remaining JEL codes (with one common exception), frequency
distributions of JEL classifications are not the same across the five journals.18 In ECO,
JEL code (C) Mathematical and Quantitative Methods is highly overrepresented, and JEL
code (J) Labor and Demographic Economics underrepresented; and in the QJE and JPE,
(J) Labor and Demographic Economics is overrepresented. Finally, considering the vintage
of articles on 31 December 2016 (the day we record their cumulative citation counts),
average article age in our data set is 15.5 years. Among the five journals, mean article
age is highest in the JPE (16.2 years), and lowest in RES (15.0 years). The top position
for the JPE is the result of a sizable reduction in the number of articles published in this
journal outlet over time, falling from 50 in 1991 to just 30 in 2010. Similarly, the low
average vintage of articles in RES, is caused in large part by an upward trend in the total
number of articles it publishes. Following a decline in article output per annum to less
than 30 per year in the years 1995 to 1997, output rose steadily thereafter to 50 articles in
2010. The youngest articles in our sample are 6 years when taking stock of their quality.
At this minimum vintage, cumulative citations received should provide a good proxy for
the long-run scholarly impact of an article (Hamermesh, 2017).
16Multiple authorship has expanded strongly over time. Of all articles published in 1991 to 2000, 59.4%
had multiple authors; in the decade that followed (2001 to 2010), this figure had risen to 71.7% (not shown
in Table 1). Like the development in average article length, this trend decline of single-authored papers
has been noted and documented in the literature (Card and DellaVigna, 2013).
17The JEL code descriptors can be found on the website of the American Economic Association, at
https://www.aeaweb.org/econlit/jelCodes.php.
18JEL code (Y) Miscellaneous Categories is not used in any journal to classify articles, and no article
in the RES is assigned JEL code (A) General Economics and Teaching.
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2.3 Empirical Strategy
To explore whether the gender composition of editorial boards is related to the publishing
success of female authors, we estimate variants of the following linear probability model:
femartijt = α0 + α1femedsharejt + δj + γt + εijt, (1)
where femartijt is a dichotomous variable taking value one if article i published in journal
j in year t has at least one female author, and zero otherwise. The explanatory variable of
key interest is femedsharejt. It measures the female editor share for journal j and year t
in which article i was published. We also control for journal fixed effects (δj) to account
for potential time-invariant systematic differences between journals in the likelihood to
publish an article that is (co-)authored by a female (base journal is AER), and time fixed
effects (γt) to account for common trend changes across journals in the publishing success
of female economists (base year is 1991). εijt is an error term. Throughout, we will cluster
standard errors at the journal-year level.
The coefficient of primary interest is α1. It captures the ceteris paribus marginal effect
of a change in the female editor share on the probability that a published article has at
least one female author. Prior research provides little guidance on the sign to expect of
α1. Studies exploring the importance of gender for evaluators’ decisions on and preferences
for candidates produced mixed findings. Some studies found evaluators to prefer same
gender candidates (Wenneras and Wold, 1997; Casadevall and Handelsman, 2014; Paola
and Scoppa, 2015), which suggests α1 > 0, i.e. more articles with female (co-) authors
should be published when female representation on editorial boards rises. Other studies
found exactly the opposite, i.e. a preference of editors for candidates of the opposite rather
than the same gender (Donald and Hamermesh, 2006; Broder, 1993; Ellemers et al., 2004),
which favors α1 < 0. There is also some empirical evidence which suggests that the gender
of candidates is irrelevant for the preferences and decisions of evaluators (Blank, 1991;
Marsh et al., 2009; Abrevaya and Hamermesh, 2012; Bagues et al., 2017), implying α1 = 0.
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To explore whether the gender composition of editorial boards is related to the quality
of articles that get published, we estimate variants of the following linear regression model:
log citationsijt = β0 + β1femedsharejt + xijt
′φ+ δ∗j + γ
∗
t + υijt, (2)
where log citationsijt is the log total citation count (plus one) as of December 2016 of article
i published in journal j in year t. We use the logarithm of citations because the citation
distribution is heavily skewed and exhibits some sizable outliers (see discussion in Section
2.2). The explanatory variable of key interest is again femedsharejt, i.e. the female editor
share of journal j in the year t that article i was published. Journal (δ∗j ) and time (γ
∗
t ) fixed
effects control for permanent quality differences between journals, respectively common
trends across journal outlets in average article quality over time and the fact that articles
published earlier are of older vintage when recording their total citation count. Vector xijt
contains further controls for article features of potential relevance for the scholarly impact
of a study. These include a measure of article length, measured in standardized pages, a
set of indicators for the number of authors to an article (base group is single author), which
ranges from 1 to 5 in our data, and a set of indicators for the 1-digit JEL codes assigned
to an article (base group is category A). The error term of the model is υijt. Again, we
will cluster standard errors at the journal-year level.
The coefficient of interest is β1. It captures how a marginal change in the female
editor share affects the citation count of published articles, i.e. their quality. If β1 > 0,
higher quality articles tend to get published when females are more strongly represented
on editorial boards. If β1 < 0, greater female representation on editorial boards tends to
harm article quality, and if β1 = 0, the gender composition of editorial boards is of no
consequence for the scholarly impact of published articles.
14
3 Results
This section reports and discusses our findings. Section 3.1 presents our results on fe-
male editorship and the frequency of female authorship, Section 3.2 our results on female
editorship and article quality. In each section, we test for the robustness of our results.
In Section 3.2, we also consider potential effect heterogeneity in the relationship between
female editorship and article quality. We conclude each section with a discussion of our
findings and the potential causal pathways that may explain them.
3.1 Female Editors and Female Authorship
Table 2 contains our main regression output on the relationship between the share of female
editors and the extent of female authorship (cf. model equation (1)). We report results for
three different estimation samples. The first sample is the largest and covers all journals in
all years of our observation period (see column (1) of Table 2). The second sample excludes
articles from the QJE and RES, as these two journals at no point in the observation period
ever have a positively-valued female editor share. The third sample excludes on top of the
QJE and RES also all articles published in 1991 to 1996, as no journal has a positive female
editor share in these first six years of our observation period (see discussion in Section 2.2
and Figure 1). The use of these different estimation samples provides a test of robustness
or sensitivity of our findings to the exclusion of journal outlets and calendar years with zero
variation in, and zero level of, the female editor share across time (in the case of journal
outlets), respectively journals (in the case of calendar years). Both in this section, and in
Section 3.2 that follows, we will make use of these three estimation samples.
Our baseline regression for the unrestricted sample produces a negative coefficient esti-
mate for our measure of female editorship which is statistically significant at the 5% level
(see column (1) of Table 2). According to this point estimate, an increase in the share of
female editors by ten percentage points reduces the likelihood of an article to have a (at
least one) female author by 2.58 percentage points. This is a quite sizable effect, given
that only 16.3% of articles published in the top-five economics journals in 1991 to 2010 are
15
Table 2: Female editors and female authorship
Dep. variable: female authorship (0/1)
(1) (2) (3)
Editor share −0.258
(0.122)
∗∗∗ −0.202
(0.099)
∗∗∗ −0.203
(0.097)
∗∗∗
QJE 0.021
(0.016)
∗∗∗
JPE −0.011
(0.016)
∗∗∗ −0.012
(0.014)
∗∗∗ −0.022
(0.017)
∗∗∗
ECO −0.074
(0.015)
∗∗∗ −0.072
(0.013)
∗∗∗ −0.072
(0.017)
∗∗∗
RES −0.036
(0.016)
∗∗∗
Constant 0.144
(0.030)
∗∗∗ 0.330
(0.054)
∗∗∗ 0.333
(0.055)
∗∗∗
R2 0.031 0.026 0.019
Observations 4,346 2,755 1,884
Notes: The table shows selected estimated coefficients from three different linear regressions. The
first column considers all articles published in 1991-2010. The second column considers all articles
published in 1991-2010, but excludes articles published in the QJE and in RES. The third column
considers all articles published in 1997-2010 and excludes articles published in the QJE and in RES.
The endogenous variable in all regressions is dichotomous taking value one if at least one author of
an article is female, and zero otherwise. Editor share measures the average female editor share of a
journal in the three years prior to the publication of an article. All specifications control for main
effects of journal outlet (base category is AER) and year fixed effects (base year is 1991). ***, **, *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Standard errors are throughout clustered
at the journal-year level and reported in parentheses.
(co-)authored by females (see summary statistics in Table 1). Restricting the estimation
sample to the AER, JPE, and ECO, as done in our second specification (see column (2) of
Table 2), produces similar results, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The same holds
true, when we omit in addition all articles published in the years 1991 through 1996 (see
column (3) of Table 2). For both the unrestricted and the two restricted estimation sam-
ples, we hence find an increase in the female editor share to be associated with a decline in
the share of articles that are (co-) authored by a female.19 Greater female representation
on editorial boards, it appears, tends to harm rather than benefit female authors in the
publishing process.20 Based on estimates from the unrestricted sample, the left graph in
19We obtain similar results when we assign the articles that were dropped because of missing gender
information to female authored articles or to male only articles.
20Estimating probit instead of linear models produces similar results, both qualitatively and quanti-
tatively. In the unrestricted sample, the estimated marginal effect is −0.26, and in the two restricted
samples, it is respectively −0.23 (each of these estimates is significant at the 5% level). Full probit results
are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 3 plots the predicted probability of an article to be (co-)authored by a female for
different female editor shares, which range from 0% to 30% in our data. Over this range,
the predicted share of articles (co-)authored by females declines almost by half, from 17.2%
when no female is on the editorial board to 9.2% when women account for a third of editors.
Figure 3: Predicted share of articles (co-)authored by females and predicted log number of
article citations for different female editor shares
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Notes: The left graph plots the predicted share of articles (co-)authored by females for different female
editor shares based on our baseline estimates for the unrestricted estimation sample reported in column
(1) of Table 2 which covers all articles published in the top-five economics journals in the period 1991 to
2010. The right graph plots predicted log citations to an article for different female editor shares based
on our estimates reported in column (1) of Table 6 which are also for the unrestricted estimation sample
and cover all articles published in the top-five economics journals in the period 1991 to 2010. The point
estimates are marked by a dot. The vertical bands indicate the 90% confidence interval of each estimate.
We conducted a series of further checks to assess the robustness of our finding (see Table
3). First, we added a quadratic term of the share of females on an editorial board to our
set of regressors to allow for potential non-linearities in the relationship between the extent
of female authorship among published articles and the degree of female representation
on editorial boards of journals. Re-estimating our model in equation (1) for the three
estimation samples considered in Table 2, however, does not produce evidence to suggest
that our baseline linear model suffers from mis-specification in functional form. As shown
in Panel A of Table 3, the estimated coefficient of the squared female editor share turns out
statistically insignificant in all three regressions, while the estimated coefficient of the non-
squared female editor share remains negative throughout and also statistically significant
at the 10% level in two out of the three regressions (in the unrestricted and in the most
restricted estimation sample).
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Table 3: Female editors and female authorship - robustness checks I
Dep. variable: female authorshipa
(1) (2) (3)
A. Linear-quadratic editor term:
Editor share −0.526
(0.294)
∗∗∗ −0.388
(0.282)
∗∗∗ −0.545
(0.280)
∗∗∗
Editor share sq. 1.287
(1.582)
∗∗∗ 0.880
(1.322)
∗∗∗ 1.608
(1.322)
∗∗∗
B. Female authorship (≥ 50%):
Editor share −0.153
(0.087)
∗∗∗ −0.121
(0.073)
∗∗∗ −0.126
(0.073)
∗∗∗
Editor shareb −0.177
(0.097)
∗∗∗ −0.135
(0.079)
∗∗∗ −0.140
(0.079)
∗∗∗
C. Articles/authors per journal and year:
Editor sharec −0.260
(0.103)
∗∗∗ −0.202
(0.101)
∗∗∗ −0.199
(0.106)
∗∗∗
Editor shared −0.131
(0.057)
∗∗∗ −0.100
(0.055)
∗∗∗ −0.097
(0.055)
∗∗∗
D. Annual female editor share in t− 2:
Editor share −0.216
(0.101)
∗∗∗ −0.184
(0.081)
∗∗∗ −0.184
(0.080)
∗∗∗
Notes: The table shows estimated coefficients of the female editor share in different regressions using
the unrestricted (in column (1)) and two restricted estimation samples (in columns (2) and (3)) from
the previous regression table (see notes to Table 2 for details). Entries in each column of Panel A are
from a different regression. In the other panels, estimates in each cell are from a different regression. a
In Panels A and D, the dependent variable is dichotomous and takes value one if at least one author
of an article is female, and zero otherwise; in Panel B, the dependent variable is dichotomous and
takes value one if at least 50% of authors of an article are female, and zero otherwise; in Panel C, the
dependent variable measures the share of all articles in a journal outlet per annum that are co-authored
by females (first row estimates in Panel C), respectively the share of all authors who publish in a
journal outlet per annum who are female (second row estimates in Panel C). b Second row estimates
in Panel B are obtained from regressions that exclude articles which are co-authored by females but
where females account for less than 50% of authors to an article. c First row estimates in Panel C are
based on regressions in which the unit of analysis is the article output of a journal in a given year.
d Second row estimates in Panel C are based on regressions in which the unit of analysis is the total
number of authors who publish in a journal in a given year. Estimates in Panel D are from regressions
that use the annual female editor share two years prior to the publication of an article. The number of
observations in columns (1), (2), and (3) is respectively 4, 346, 2, 755, and 1, 844 in Panel A, in the first
row of Panel B and in Panel D, 4, 163, 2, 657, and 1, 801 in the second row of Panel B, and 100, 60, and
42 in Panel C. All specifications control for main effects of journal outlet (base category is AER) and
year fixed effects (base year is 1991). ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level. Standard errors are throughout clustered at the journal-year level and reported in parentheses.
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Second, we changed our dependent variable to a dichotomous measure of female author-
ship of an article that takes value one if at least 50% of authors of an article are female, and
zero otherwise. This alternative dependent variable hence identifies only articles with sig-
nificant or predominantly female authorship (rather than all articles with a positive female
author share that may be but marginal on occasion). We estimated two sets of regressions,
one for all articles in the respective three estimation samples (see first row estimates in
Panel B of Table 3), and one for articles that are either all male in authorship or that have
at least 50% females among their authors (see second row estimates in Panel B of Table
3).21 As is evident, estimated coefficients in all six specifications are again negatively signed
and differ but little within and across our three basic estimation samples. Furthermore,
five of the six estimates are statistically significant at the 10% level. Our basic finding
of a negative relationship between the female editor share and female authorship hence
proves robust also to changes in the way we measure such authorship and changes in the
baseline type of article we consider in the analysis as a benchmark (all-male, respectively
not all-male authored).22
Third, we changed the unit of analysis from an individual article to the body of all
articles published in a journal per annum (see first row estimates in Panel C of Table
3), respectively the total of authors who published in a journal in a particular year (see
second row estimates in Panel C of Table 3). These changes necessitate also a change in
our dependent variable. For the first exercise, we consider the yearly share of articles per
journal that are co-authored by females;23 and for the second, we consider the yearly share
of female authors per journal.24 By virtue of the first change, we exploit only journal-year
variation in female authorship and in the female editor share. The second change, in turn,
21In the former case, a zero value of our dichotomous dependent variable hence identifies articles with
a zero or low share (< 50%) of females among the authors. In the latter, a zero value is assigned only
to all-male articles and articles where women account for a minority of authors are dropped from the
estimation sample.
22We obtain similar results when we use the share of females among the authors of an article as dependent
variable.
23The yearly share of articles that are co-authored by females is obtained by dividing the number of
female co-authored articles published in a journal in a given year by the total number of articles published
in that journal and year.
24The yearly share of female authors is obtained by dividing the number of female authors who published
in a journal in a particular year by the total number of authors who published in that journal in the same
year.
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provides a way to check whether the gender composition of authors to an article may be
affected by changes in the female editor share in a way such that less articles with at least
one female author may be published (our baseline result) but at the same time the share
of females among all authors who publish in a journal outlet per year does not show such
a decline (or possibly even an increase). However, both type of analyses again produce an
estimated negative coefficient of the female editor share that is significant at least at the
10% level. Consistent with our baseline findings, more female editors are associated with
less articles that are co-authored by females, as well as fewer females among the authors
who publish in a journal outlet per annum.
Fourth, we replaced the female editor share for the three years prior to the publication
of an article with the annual female editor share two years prior to the publication of
an article. The latter measure has been favored and used in some of the literature (see
Brogaard et al. (2014)). However, estimated coefficients of the female editor share again
remain negatively signed and statistically significant in all three estimation samples.25
Finally, we used two alternative measures of female representation on an editorial board
that better reflect the discrete nature of changes (or differences) in the gender composition
of editorial boards that is caused by the appointment (or presence) of a female editor. So
far, we have explored only the impact of a continuous change in the female editor share
on the publishing success of female authors. Such change, however, need not be caused
by the appointment of a female editor and does not differentiate between changes in the
gender composition of boards at the extensive and intensive margin.26 In a first set of
regressions (see first row estimates in Table 4), we replaced the continuous female editor
share with a dichotomous variable that takes value one if the female editor share is above
0%, and zero otherwise. This alternative measure hence considers only changes at the
extensive margin. Furthermore, in a second set of regressions (see second row in Table 4),
25The same holds true if we use the annual female editor share one and three years (instead of two years)
prior to the publication of an article.
26As noted in Section 2.1, a change in the editor share may be caused not only by appointments and
retirements of editors, but also by changes in the absolute number of editors, the particular time that a
new appointment or retirement occurs within a given year (i.e. from which issue in a year an editorial
change takes effect), and by averaging over a moving three-year window prior to the publication of an
article.
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we used (as yet another alternative measure) a dichotomous variable that takes value one
if a female editor was newly appointed to an editorial board in the three years prior to the
publication of an article and excluded from the estimation sample all observations where
the female editor share is above 0% but no female editor has been appointed in these three
pre-publication years. The latter specification hence entails a comparison between articles
published by boards that are either all male or have recently appointed a female editor. As
is evident, however, estimated coefficients remain negatively signed in both specifications
and are statistically significant at the 10% level in five out of the six regressions.
Table 4: Female editors and female authorship - robustness checks II
Dep. variable: female authorship
(1) (2) (3)
Female Editor (0/1)a −0.037
(0.016)
∗∗∗ −0.025
(0.015)
∗∗∗ −0.028
(0.015)
∗∗∗
Female Editor (0/1)b −0.035
(0.015)
∗∗∗ −0.028
(0.014)
∗∗∗ −0.034
(0.013)
∗∗∗
Notes: The table shows estimated coefficients in different regressions of a dummy variable which
indicates whether a women is present on an editorial board. The first column considers all articles
published in 1991-2010 (unrestricted sample), the second column excludes from this sample all articles
published in the QJE and in RES (restricted sample 1), and the third column furthermore excludes
all articles published in 1991-1996 (restricted sample 2). The endogenous variable in all regressions
is dichotomous, taking value one if at least one author of an article is female, and zero otherwise.
Estimates in each cell are from a different regression. a First row estimates are from regressions that
use a dichotomous explanatory variable which takes value one if the share of female editors is above
0%. b Second row estimates are from regressions that use a explanatory dichotomous variable which
that takes value one if a female editor was appointed in the three years prior to the publication of an
article. In this second set of regressions, observations are excluded from the estimation sample where
the female editor share is above 0% but no female editor was appointed in the three years prior to the
publication of an article. The number of observations in columns (1), (2), and (3) is respectively 4, 346,
2, 755, and 1, 844 in the first row and 4, 020, 2, 429, and 1, 558 in the second row. All specifications
control for main effects of journal outlet (base category is AER) and year fixed effects (base year is
1991). ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Standard errors are
throughout clustered at the journal-year level and reported in parentheses.
Summarizing the above, our key finding of a negative relationship between the share
of female editors and the extent of female authorship proves robust to a whole set of
sensitivity checks. While our results provide no evidence on the specific causal pathways
underlying this negative relationship, they are consistent with several explanations put
forward in the literature. First, female editors may expect that there is an upper limit
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to the number of female authors who get accepted in the male dominated publishing
process. To protect their standing as top female economists, female editors may hence
discriminate against submissions by female authors (Broder, 1993). Second, male editors
may be more supportive of submissions by female authors in an all-male editorial board
than in a mixed-gender board, if female evaluators strengthen male identity (Akerlof and
Kranton, 2000). Third, the behavior of female editors may be characterized by a ”queen
bee syndrome”which makes female editors prefer male over female authors. Female editors
may discriminate against female authors because they have got used to the male dominated
system, have adjusted to it, and do not want it to change (Ellemers et al., 2004). Fourth,
the appointment of a top female economist as an editor may significantly reduce the time
she has available for research and harm her scholarly output. If so, and if the pool of top
female economists is small, the (submission and) publication share of females in top-five
economics journals may suffer as a consequence (Vernos, 2013).27 Finally, female authors
may submit fewer articles to journals with female editors because they expect a higher
likelihood of rejection by female editors. It is also possible that female authors submit lower
quality articles to journals with female editors because they expect, but do not receive, a
preferential treatment by female editors. Hence, more female articles are rejected and less
female articles get published.
Given our data, we cannot adjudicate between these rival, yet potentially also comple-
mentary, explanations. In any case, however, our findings clearly suggest that the pub-
lishing process in economics is not governed by simple sex discrimination of men against
women that could easily be rectified by (and hence would justify undifferentiated calls for)
greater female representation on editorial boards. The various potential root causes we
reviewed above also support this critical view and call for utmost caution in the choice of
policy tools to promote greater gender equality.
In the next section, we explore whether the female editor share is of consequence also
for the average quality of articles that get published in a journal, as measured by the
27We re-estimated all specifications dropping articles co-authored by the female editors in our sample.
The estimated coefficients of the female editor share, however, remain negative, significant, and virtually
identical in magnitude to those of our baseline regressions. The same holds true when we only drop articles
published by the female editors in the journals where they are editors at some point in time.
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cumulative citations an article receives. We will also investigate, whether greater female
representation on editorial boards has a different effect on the quality of articles that are
co-authored by females, i.e. we will explore potential effect heterogeneity by gender of
author.
3.2 Female Editors and Article Quality
Tables 5 and 6 contain our main regression output on the relationship between the share of
female editors and the quality of published articles, as measured by the log of cumulative
citations an article has received by December 2016. We estimate two versions of model
equation (2), one that controls for the female editor share only in levels (see Table 5), and
one that adds also its quadratic to the set of regressors (see Table 6). As in the last section,
we again report results in each case for three different estimation samples, the unrestricted
full sample, and the two samples with restricted journal coverage, respectively restricted
journal and year coverage.
The main regression output for the first model version is shown in Table 5. As is
evident, the female editor share does not exert a statistically significant influence on the
citation count of an article in any of the three estimation samples.28 Other regressors
have estimated coefficients that are signed as expected and also statistically significant
(see discussion in Section 2.1). Articles in the QJE tend to receive the most citations
and articles in RES the least. The length of an article (measured in standardized pages)
and the number of co-authors to an article both exert a positive effect on the cumulative
number of citations an article receives. JEL fixed effects also help to explain variation in
article performance (not shown).29 Overall, the estimated models explain between one fifth
and one fourth of the total variation in log citations in our data, a sizable fraction.
However, the models we estimated assume a linear relationship between the female
editor share and log article citations, which might be too restrictive a functional form.30
28Running quantile regressions for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles also produce coefficient
estimates for the female editor share that lack statistical significance.
29The F-statistic for the joint significance of the JEL fixed effects is 7.31.
30Note also that estimated coefficients of our key regressor, although statistically insignificant, are all of
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Table 5: Female editors and article citations
Dep. variable: log(citations+1)
(1) (2) (3)
Editor share 0.002
(0.271)
∗∗∗ 0.397
(0.280)
∗∗∗ 0.349
(0.251)
∗∗∗
QJE 0.242
(0.054)
∗∗∗
JPE −0.108
(0.049)
∗∗∗ −0.105
(0.046)
∗∗∗ −0.213
(0.048)
∗∗∗
ECO −0.188
(0.043)
∗∗∗ −0.171
(0.045)
∗∗∗ −0.200
(0.053)
∗∗∗
RES −0.673
(0.047)
∗∗∗
Article length 0.024
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.023
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.021
(0.002)
∗∗∗
1 coauthors 0.158
(0.035)
∗∗∗ 0.118
(0.045)
∗∗∗ 0.135
(0.053)
∗∗∗
2 coauthors 0.297
(0.052)
∗∗∗ 0.225
(0.067)
∗∗∗ 0.214
(0.079)
∗∗∗
3 coauthors 0.583
(0.095)
∗∗∗ 0.556
(0.138)
∗∗∗ 0.479
(0.158)
∗∗∗
4 coauthors 0.837
(0.206)
∗∗∗ 0.204
(0.163)
∗∗∗ 0.142
(0.188)
∗∗∗
Constant 3.432
(0.107)
∗∗∗ 2.667
(0.144)
∗∗∗ 2.814
(0.145)
∗∗∗
R2 0.238 0.186 0.203
Observations 4,431 2,802 1,915
Notes: The table shows selected estimated coefficients from three different regressions. The first
column considers all articles published in 1991-2010 (unrestricted sample), the second column excludes
from this sample all articles published in the QJE and in RES (restricted sample 1), and the third
column furthermore excludes all articles published in 1991-1996 (restricted sample 2). The dependent
variable in all regressions is the log of the total citations count of an article plus one as of December
2016. All specifications control for main effects of journal outlet (base category is AER), year fixed
effects (base year is 1991), and 1-digit JEL code fixed effects (base category is A). ***, **, * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Standard errors are throughout clustered at the
journal-year level and reported in parentheses.
We therefore re-estimated all specifications using a linear-quadratic instead of a linear
term for our key explanatory variable, i.e. the female editor share. As shown in Table 6,
allowing for potential non-linearities in the relationship between the female editor share and
log citations proves crucial. In all three estimation samples, the estimated coefficient of the
female editor share is now positive and significant. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of its
squared term is throughout negative and significant. The respective absolute magnitudes
the same sign. This is at least indicative of a systematic relationship between the female editor share and
average article quality.
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Table 6: Female editors and article citations - alternative specification
Dep. variable: log(citations+1)
(1) (2) (3)
Editor share 1.471
(0.763)
∗∗∗ 2.724
(0.863)
∗∗∗ 1.734
(0.868)
∗∗∗
Editor share sq. −7.065
(3.178)
∗∗∗ −11.07
(3.425)
∗∗∗ −6.546
(3.632)
∗∗∗
R2 0.238 0.188 0.204
Observations 4,431 2,802 1,915
Notes: The table shows estimated coefficients of the female editor share and its square in different
regressions. The first column considers all articles published in 1991-2010 (unrestricted sample), the
second column excludes from this sample all articles published in the QJE and in RES (restricted
sample 1), and the third column furthermore excludes all articles published in 1991-1996 (restricted
sample 2). The dependent variable in all regressions is the log of the total citations count of an
article plus one as of December 2016. All specifications control for main effects of journal outlet (base
category is AER), year fixed effects (base year is 1991), article length (number of standardized pages),
number of coauthors (base category is single-authored article), and 1-digit JEL code fixed effects (base
category is A). ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Standard errors
are throughout clustered at the journal-year level and reported in parentheses.
of these differently signed estimates imply that the sign of the total effect of the female
editor share eventually changes from positive to negative when the size of the female editor
share gets larger.31 This is illustrated graphically in the right graph of Figure 3 which plots
predicted log citations to an article for different female editor shares based on our estimates
reported in column (1) of Table 6 for the unrestricted estimation sample. Marginal increases
in the female editor share begin to exert a negative effect on article quality when female
representation on editorial boards exceeds 11.7%, and female editor shares above 22.2%
even cause average article quality to fall below the level predicted for boards with zero
female representation. In other words, female editors seem to benefit article quality at
low levels of representation on editorial boards, but tend to harm article quality at higher
levels.
We also checked the robustness of this finding in several ways. First, we used an
alternative system of classifying articles into major thematic fields to control for potential
level differences in citations by research area. Replacing our set of indicators for 1-digit
31Least-absolute deviation (LAD) regressions yield virtually identical results in terms of the sign, magni-
tude, and statistical significance of our key estimated coefficients. The estimated coefficient of the squared
female editor share in specification (3), however, is only imprecisely estimated when using LAD.
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Table 7: Female editors and article citations - robustness checks I
Dep. variable: log(citations+1)
(1) (2) (3)
A. Alternative JEL classification:
Editor share 1.485
(0.805)
∗∗∗ 2.731
(0.920)
∗∗∗ 1.718
(0.916)
∗∗∗
Editor share sq. −6.726
(3.322)
∗∗∗ −10.69
(3.657)
∗∗∗ −5.999
(3.784)
∗∗∗
B. Articles per journal and year:
Editor share 4.889
(1.634)
∗∗∗ 5.649
(1.671)
∗∗∗ 4.676
(1.557)
∗∗∗
Editor share sq. −26.33
(7.292)
∗∗∗ −27.98
(7.441)
∗∗∗ −23.74
(6.970)
∗∗∗
C. Annual female editor share in t− 2:
Editor share 1.310
(0.626)
∗∗∗ 1.998
(0.638)
∗∗∗ 1.424
(0.630)
∗∗∗
Editor share sq. −5.916
(2.375)
∗∗∗ −7.510
(2.278)
∗∗∗ −5.162
(2.325)
∗∗∗
Notes: The table shows estimated coefficients of the female editor share and its square in different
regressions. The first column considers all articles published in 1991-2010 (unrestricted sample), the
second column excludes from this sample all articles published in the QJE and in RES (restricted sample
1), and the third column furthermore excludes all articles published in 1991-1996 (restricted sample
2). The dependent variable in all regressions, except those in Panel B, is the log of the total citations
count of an article plus one as of December 2016. Entries in each column of a panel are from a different
regression. In Panel B, the dependent variable measures the log of the total number of citations that
the sum of articles published in a particular journal and year have received as of December 2016. The
unit of analysis in Panel B is hence the entire article output of a journal in a given year. Estimates in
Panel C are from regressions that use the annual female editor share two years prior to publication as
independent variable. The number of observations in columns (1), (2), and (3) is respectively 4, 431,
2, 802, and 1, 915 in Panels A and C, and 100, 60, and 42 in Panel B. All specifications control for main
effects of journal outlet (base category is AER), year fixed effects (base year is 1991), article length
(number of standardized pages), number of coauthors (base category is single-authored article), and 1-
digit JEL code fixed effects (base category is A), except those in Panel A, which use instead indicators
for fourteen thematic groups following the classification of Card and DellaVigna (2013). ***, **, *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Standard errors are throughout clustered
at the journal-year level and reported in parentheses.
JEL codes, we make use of a classification suggested by Card and DellaVigna (2013) which
groups articles into fourteen thematic groups. As shown in Panel A of Table 7, however,
this change in classification proves immaterial. The relationship between log citations and
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female editor share remains hump-shaped.32 In fact, estimated coefficients for the female
editor share and its square differ little from those obtained in our baseline regressions
reported in Table 6.
Second, we again changed the unit of analysis from an individual article to the body
of all articles published in a journal per annum and regress the log of total citations
received by articles published in a particular journal and year on the female editor share
of that journal for the same year (see Panel B of Table 7). By virtue of this change
in the unit of analysis, we exploit only journal-year variation in article citations and in
the female editor share in the analysis. As is evident, however, this robustness check also
produces estimated coefficients for the female editor share and its square that are positively,
respectively negatively signed, and statistically significant in all three estimation samples.
Third, we again replaced the average female editor share over the last three years
before an article was published with the annual female editor share two years prior to its
publication (see Brogaard et al. (2014)). Estimated coefficients of the female editor share
and its square remain positively, respectively negatively signed and statistically significant
in all three estimation samples.33
Fourth, we again used two alternative measures of female representation on an editorial
board that better reflect the discrete nature of changes (or differences) in the gender com-
position of editorial boards that is caused by the appointment (or presence) of a female
editor. First, to consider only changes at the extensive margin, we replaced the continuous
female editor share with a dichotomous variable that takes value one if the female editor
share is above 0%, and zero otherwise (see first row estimates in Table 8). Second, to
compare articles published by boards that are either all male or have recently appointed a
female editor, we used instead a dichotomous variable that takes value one if a female editor
was newly appointed to an editorial board in the three years prior to the publication of an
article and excluded from the estimation sample all observations where the female editor
share is above 0% but no female editor has been appointed in these three pre-publication
32The same holds true if we omit all controls for classifying articles into alternative fields.
33We again obtain qualitatively identical (albeit at times imprecisely estimated) coefficients if we use
the annual female editor share one and three years (instead of two years) prior to the publication of an
article.
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Table 8: Female editors and article citations - robustness checks II
Dep. variable: log(citations+1)
(1) (2) (3)
Female Editor (0/1)a 0.034
(0.046)
∗∗∗ 0.120
(0.051)
∗∗∗ 0.089
(0.047)
∗∗∗
Female Editor (0/1)b 0.032
(0.046)
∗∗∗ 0.092
(0.050)
∗∗∗ 0.049
(0.041)
∗∗∗
Notes: The table shows estimated coefficients in different regressions of a dummy variable which
indicates whether a women is present on an editorial board. The first column considers all articles
published in 1991-2010 (unrestricted sample), the second column excludes from this sample all articles
published in the QJE and in RES (restricted sample 1), and the third column furthermore excludes
all articles published in 1991-1996 (restricted sample 2). The dependent variable in all regressions is
the log of the total citations count of an article plus one as of December 2016. Estimates in each cell
are from a different regression. a First row estimates are from regressions that use a dichotomous
explanatory variable which takes value one if the share of female editors is above 0%. b Second row
estimates are from regressions that use a explanatory dichotomous variable which that takes value one
if a female editor was appointed in the three years prior to the publication of an article. In this second
set of regressions, observations are excluded from the estimation sample where the female editor share
is above 0% but no female editor was appointed in the three years prior to the publication of an article.
The number of observations in columns (1), (2), and (3) is respectively 4, 431, 2, 802, and 1, 915 in the
first row and 4, 101, 2, 472, and 1, 585 in the second row. All specifications control for main effects of
journal outlet (base category is AER), year fixed effects (base year is 1991), article length (number of
standardized pages), number of coauthors (base category is single-authored article), and 1-digit JEL
code fixed effects (base category is A). ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level. Standard errors are throughout clustered at the journal-year level and reported in parentheses.
years (see second row estimates in Table 8). Reassuringly, estimated coefficients turn out
positively signed (albeit at times imprecisely estimated) in both specifications and for all
estimation samples (unrestricted and restricted).
Finally, we added two types of control variables to capture thematic congruence between
editors and articles (not tabulated).34 In a first set of regressions, we used a dichotomous
variable that takes value one if the thematic field of an article is congruent with at least
one of the two main research fields of any editor in charge in the last three years prior to
the publication of the article, and zero otherwise.35 In a second set of regressions, we added
in addition to this binary variable also a dichotomous variable that takes value one if the
thematic field of an article is congruent with the main research fields of a female editor
34Tabulated regressions results are available from the authors upon request.
35We defined the main research fields of an editor by the two most frequently assigned one-digit JEL
codes of the articles the editor published in the years 1992 until 2017.
28
(if present) at the journal outlet over the same period, and zero otherwise. Estimating
both specifications for the three estimation samples using our linear-quadratic term for the
female editor share produces identical results to those of our baseline specification reported
in Table 6. Moreover, the coefficients of the two binary indicators for thematic congruence
of articles and editors lack statistical significance in both specifications and all estimation
samples.
Before we discuss potential explanations for our findings on the relationship between
the female editor share of a journal and the average quality of the articles it publishes, we
explore whether this relationship is subject to effect heterogeneity by gender composition
of an article’s authorship, i.e. whether greater female representation on editorial boards
has a different effect on the quality of articles whose authorship is largely or exclusively
female. For this purpose, we augment regression model (2) by adding to its set of regres-
sors an indicator that takes value one if at least 50% of its authors are female, and zero
otherwise, and the interactions of this indicator with the female editor share variable and
its square. Estimated key coefficients of this modified model for our three estimation sam-
ples are reported in Table 9. Estimated coefficients of the female authorship dummy are
throughout insignificant and also alternate in sign. Articles with a largely or exclusively
female authorship hence do not differ systematically from other articles in the average
number of citations they receive. Estimated coefficients of the female editor share and
its square, in turn, are signed as before, suggesting a hump-shaped relationship between
log citations and the female editor share of a journal outlet. The two interaction terms,
however, both lack statistical significance in all three estimation samples. This suggests
that the relationship between the female editor share of a journal and the average quality
of its articles does not depend on the gender composition of an article’s authorship.36
Given our data, we may again only speculate on the factors behind the robust hump-
shaped relationship between the female editor share of a journal and log citations of its
articles. We review two potential explanations which have received some support in the
literature but were advanced for areas other than the scientific publishing process in eco-
36We obtain similar results when we use an alternative system to classify articles into major thematic
fields or replace the female editor share with the annual average share of female editors two years prior to
publication.
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Table 9: Female editors and article citations - effect heterogeneity
Dep. variable: log(citations+1)
(1) (2) (3)
Female authorship (≥ 50%) −0.024
(0.054)
∗∗∗ 0.048
(0.072)
∗∗∗ 0.131
(0.096)
∗∗∗
Editor share 1.406
(0.769)
∗∗∗ 2.676
(0.849)
∗∗∗ 1.769
(0.884)
∗∗∗
Editor share sq. −6.738
(3.223)
∗∗∗ −10.82
(3.402)
∗∗∗ −6.499
(3.741)
∗∗∗
Female authorship (≥ 50%) × Editor share −0.515
(1.477)
∗∗∗ −1.556
(1.652)
∗∗∗ −2.914
(1.915)
∗∗∗
Female authorship (≥ 50%) × Editor share sq. 1.211
(5.938)
∗∗∗ 4.568
(6.331)
∗∗∗ 9.095
(6.881)
∗∗∗
R2 0.237 0.190 0.209
Observations 4,346 2,755 1,884
Notes: The table shows selected estimated coefficients from different regressions. The first column
considers all articles published in 1991-2010 (unrestricted sample), the second column excludes from
this sample all articles published in the QJE and in RES (restricted sample 1), and the third column
furthermore excludes all articles published in 1991-1996 (restricted sample 2). The dependent variable
in all regressions is the log of the total citations count of an article plus one as of December 2016. All
specifications control for main effects of journal outlet (base category is AER), year fixed effects (base
year is 1991), article length (number of standardized pages), number of coauthors (base category is
single-authored article), and 1-digit JEL code fixed effects (base category is A). ***, **, * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Standard errors are throughout clustered at the
journal-year level and reported in parentheses.
nomics. First, the hump-shape relationship may be explained by the existence of gendered
networks, their break up and growth. Gendered networks, which have been used to ex-
plain, amongst others, gender differences in labor market outcomes (Saloner, 1985), may
impede the merit-based selection process in the publishing process if they cause articles of
lesser quality of network members (insiders) to be published and articles of higher quality
of non-members (outsiders) to be rejected. In economics, men dominate editorial boards.
At low levels of representation on editorial boards, female editors may break up existing
networks of male editors, sort out particularly low quality papers of insiders and thereby
help to realize efficiency gains. At higher levels of representation, however, female networks
themselves may start to take root and bias the selection of articles for publication in the
editorial decision process, harming article quality.
A second explanation for our finding of a hump-shaped relationship between the female
editor share of a journal and log citations of its articles is that the appointment of women
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to a group of male evaluators may improve the performance of this group (Wooley et al.,
2010) by enabling them to better identify articles of the highest quality, but that such
productivity effect is reversed and group performance even harmed when the share of
female evaluators reaches a critical value.
4 Conclusion
Although female economists today are found more often in higher academic positions than
some decades ago, they continue to be severely under-represented in the higher echelons
of academic professions. In this study, we have explored a new potential root cause of
this differential performance by gender, the male domination of editorial boards. Based
on a self-compiled data set for the top-five economics journals containing information on
the gender composition of their editorial boards and the gender mix of the authorship of
articles published by these journals in the years 1991 to 2010, we have explored whether
the female editor share is of consequence for the share of articles that are (co-)authored by
females and the quality of articles that get published.
Our findings suggest that the gender composition of editorial boards does affect both
dimensions. However, female editors appear to reduce, rather than increase, the share of
articles that are (co-)authored by females. The under-representation of female editors in
the top-five economics journals hence does not seem to be an obstacle for female economists
in the academic publishing process. Several reasons may account for this finding. While we
cannot test for these, given our data, we have reviewed potential candidate explanations
that have been advanced in the literature, albeit for different areas. We also found that the
female editor share is systematically related to the quality of articles that get published
in a journal, as measured by their citation count. Specifically, we found a hump-shaped
relationship between the female editor share and log citations, which suggests that female
editors tend to benefit article quality at low levels of representation on editorial boards, but
harm article quality at higher levels. Moreover, in additional explorations, we did not find
any evidence that this relationship is subject to effect heterogeneity by gender composition
of an article’s authorship. We reviewed two potential explanations for this finding, but
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given our data cannot test them to assess their respective importance.
Our first set of findings suggests that the publishing process in economics is not gov-
erned by simple sex discrimination of men against women that could easily be rectified by
(and hence would justify undifferentiated calls for) greater female representation on edito-
rial boards. The various potential root causes we reviewed for this finding also support this
critical view and call for utmost caution in the choice of policy tools to promote greater
gender equality. Future research is required to test these rival, yet potentially complemen-
tary explanations and identify the major causal pathways for our results on the publishing
success of female authors and the quality of articles. Such research could also fruitfully
broaden the scope of analysis by considering a larger set of journals and by expanding the
observation period to include also the more distant past.
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